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Suppose we set this up in a reasonable, safe, and logical way to mature the KERISuite first on a small technical team. And we only then start diversifying; do you see yourself in any role at any point in time in the future? We welcome your positive contributions.
The proposal is a minimal, sufficient, practical, and simple means to a minimal enough end to meet the regulatory requirements in the domicile. Of course, our proposal will comply with the authorities and not-for-profit foundation’s requirements.
One individual has to take up various roles at the beginning of the foundation. In this perspective, anno 2025, the answer to the question is ‘to a great extent, yes’ 🙂
But bear in mind: We developed a role-based organizational chart, an Operational Agreement, and a Memorandum of Understanding. So, it’s a consensus-critical manager-managed operation in the foundation.
Without painful consequences, no single role within the foundation could dictate or veto the operation. All competence profiles have been specified and published.
Moreover, the foundation is independent of individuals, except that the BDFL role in the KERI foundation is reserved on a personal basis for Dr. Samuel Smith.
We honestly can’t take people seriously when they complain about a compact KERI foundation, which the original inventor is totally in sync with, and a two-way commitment between the foundation and founder has been established.
The chairman and Sam could decide independently of anybody else. To gain something, you also have to give. It would not find the support of a larger community.
It’s the community foundation supported by KERI’s inventor Dr. Samuel M. Smith. Any qualified majority in the board makes decisions on all but a few topics. These topics are reserved for the technical manager with a few veto rights for the original inventor, which conforms to the well-established BDFL model.
Having stated this, we will always strive for consensus, but by all means, avoid takeovers or stalemates.
Thus, we wish to protect the original inventor’s work and future role. Furthermore, we wish to gradually develop the Foundation into a business-like, not-for-profit, open-source foundation where takeovers by narrow interest groups are impossible.
We can do this via:
A. Statutes and organizational regulations
B. Board composition
Ad A.
Statutes tend to be rigid. We create them, put them in a drawer, respect them, and only take them out when something happens. We will flexibly adjust the organization along the lines we lay out. We’ve used a standard Utah template, “Muli-Member L3C, Manager-Managed Organization Agreement”, for that.
And that’s where anyone donating and participating in the roles, tasks, and deliverables laid out has to trust what we do for the community.
Ad B.
See the organizational chart, the competence profiles, and the Memorandum of Understanding (Start 2025: status concept)
Who do you trust more to guide this process: the KERI team, including the original inventor, or some local interest group with an urgent agenda?
We aim for the more considerable support that we expect to be given to the proof of work team, the original KERI team.
History
Initially, the idea was to give all parties a voice and bring them together in one forum: the Advisory Board. The founders have reserved a seat on the board with decision-making authority for the leader of that Advisory Board.
This concession isn’t necessary for the current state of affairs, nor would it be the first choice to expand the board, but the founders expressed their appreciation by bundling advice in this board vote.
It constitutes the Best of Both Worlds: A small team can act fast and finish the work (5Ws). All stakeholders get a voice, and based on consensus in the advisory board, their chairman/leader has a seat with voting rights on the board of directors to represent the common interests of the stakeholders without slowing down the operations through endless discussions and individual interests.
A BDFL, which stands for “Benevolent Dictator For Life,” is an informal title given to influential leaders in open-source software development projects.
This term typically refers to project founders or primary creators who retain final decision-making authority over the project’s direction and development.
The concept of BDFL originated in 1995 and is closely associated with the Python programming language community. Guido van Rossum, the creator of Python, was jokingly named the “First Interim BDFL”.
Key characteristics of a BDFL include:
1. Ultimate authority on technical decisions
2. Influence over coding standards and core design philosophies
3. Veto power over proposed changes
4. Collaborative work with the community while maintaining a consistent vision
Notable examples of BDFLs include:
• Guido van Rossum (Python)
• Linus Torvalds (Linux kernel)
• Larry Wall (Perl)
• Yukihiro Matsumoto (Ruby)
• Samuel Smith (Keri)
It’s important to note that the BDFL title is honorary and based on community trust. If a BDFL were to act irresponsibly, the project could be forked.
Originally, this idea was solely to give all parties a voice and bring that together in one forum. The proposed managers of the designed board happily reserve a seat on the board for this purpose, with decision-making authority: the leader of the Advisory Board.
If anyone asks to let go of control, have you put your money where your mouth is?
The founding chairman has committed to donating to get the foundation started. So far, we haven’t seen anyone else making a similar commitment.
So, he wants to set up this vehicle to ensure that the internal processes are efficient, funds are spent effectively, and the required targets are met. Â
Van Cann: “I’ll stop when I think: would I leave this system alone and trust its inner workings? And only when the answer is ‘yes’”
